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Abstract:  This study measures risk attitudes using two paid experiments:  the Holt and Laury 
(2002) procedure and a variation of the game show Deal or No Deal. The participants also 
completed a series of personality questionnaires developed in the psychology literature including 
the risk domains of Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002). As in previous studies risk attitudes vary 
within subjects across elicitation methods. However, this variation can be partially explained by 
individual personality traits.  Specifically, subjects behave as though the Holt and Laury task is 
an investment decision while the Deal or No Deal task is a gambling decision.   
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“Perhaps the relatively modest predictive validity of risk aversion for actual risk-taking behaviour 
(for example, Barsky et al.1997) might be improved considerably with a multidimensional and 
domain-specific approach to its measurement.”  – Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel 
(2008, p. 39)  
 
1. Introduction 
People routinely have to make decisions under uncertainty due to incomplete 
information.  The perceived degree of uncertainty by individuals affects their decisions regarding 
consumption, saving and investing decisions, and selection of warranties and insurance policies.  
It also impacts the decision to engage in certain activities such as crime, extreme sports, and 
unprotected sex, as well as more pedestrian matters such as crossing the street.  In a first price 
sealed bid procurement auction, how much a potential supplier should bid is a function of the 
bidder’s risk parameter and beliefs regarding the risk parameters of the other bidders (see Cox, 
Smith, and Walker 1988, Harrison 1990 and Van Boening, Rassenti, and Smith 1998).  The 
decision to even hold such an auction is based upon the buyer’s risk preferences and belief about 
the risk preferences of the potential bidders.   
The standard technique used in economics and finance is to model risk with a particular 
functional form.  The two most common are constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) which is 
modeled as γ
γ
−=
−
1
)(
1xxu , where r denotes the coefficient of risk aversion, and constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA) which is modeled as σ
σ
−
−= )exp()( xxu , where σ denotes the coefficient of 
risk aversion.1 Disappointingly, these models have not proven satisfying.  Consider the equity 
                                                            
1 The current paper focuses on CRRA as it remains predominant in the economics literature.  However, a variety of 
other forms have been promoted, most notably the model of prospect theory in which the agent is risk averse over 
gains and risk loving over losses.  Andersen et al. (2006a) provide an application of the expo-power utility function 
introduced by Saha (1993) which generalizes the CARA and CRRA functions and Andersen et al. (2007) consider 
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion.  
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premium puzzle which emerges from the problem faced by an individual when deciding between 
riskless and risky assets for their investment portfolio. The term “equity premium puzzle” 
emerged from a study by Mehra and Prescott (1985) where the authors showed that the observed 
difference between the stock market return and the return offered by government bonds in the 
US implied an implausibly high degree of individuals’ risk aversion. For example, according to 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995), the degree of risk aversion that is consistent with the observed 
difference would make an individual indifferent between a bet that pays US$ 50,000 or US$ 
100,000 and a certain payoff of US$ 51,209, in other words extremely risk averse.  A similar 
argument is made by Rabin (2000).  Fudenberg and Levine (2006) proposed an alternative model 
of behavior in which individuals make a distinction between small stakes and large stakes.2   
Given the ubiquitous nature of decision making under uncertainty in society, it is no 
wonder that numerous researchers have studied risk attitudes in a variety of settings.  One that 
has received considerable attention recently is the game show Deal or No Deal (see Deck, Lee, 
and Reyes 2008, Bombardini and Trebbi 2005, Mulino, Scheelings, Brooks, and Faff 2006, De 
Roos and Sarafidis 2006, Baltussen, Post, Thaler, and van den Assem 2008, Andersen et al. 
2006a,b, and Blavatsky and Pogrebna 2006, and Botti et al. 2007).3 There is typically a wide 
variation of measured risk attitudes in a study and across studies.  As suggested by Mulino, 
Scheelings, Brooks, and Faff (2006) and Botti et al. (2007) risk aversion is affected by 
individual-specific characteristics, such as age and gender. Additionally, as hinted by Baltussen, 
Post, Thaler, and van den Assem (2008), the effects of prior outcomes and the role of cultural, 
                                                            
2 See Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt, and Dasgupta (2007) for a test of various models of risk aversion including the dual self 
model of Fudenberg and Levine (2006). 
3 Deal or no Deal is not a unique program in its ability to provide insight on behavior. Other shows that also provide 
natural experiments on risk attitudes include Card Sharks (Gertner, 1993), Final Jeopardy! (Metrick, 1995), for 
Illinois Instant Riches (Hersch and McDougall, 1997), Lingo (Beetsma and Schotman, 2001), Hoosier Millionaire 
(Fullenkamp, Terino, and Battalio, 2003), and Who Wants To Be A Millionaire (Hartley, Lanet, and Walker, 2005).  
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social and/or economic background could play a substantial role in explaining the high variation 
observed in the estimates for individuals’ risk aversion parameters.   
Controlled laboratory experiments can also be used to study risk attitudes.   Numerous 
researchers have attempted to elicit certainty equivalents for lotteries through theoretically 
truthfully revealing mechanisms such as the BDM procedure developed by Becker, Degroot and 
Marshak (1963).  An alternative approach to measuring risk attitudes is through observing bids 
in first price private value auctions as mentioned above.  Holt and Laury (2002) developed a 
series of binary comparisons in which the prizes are the same for each comparison but the 
probability of receiving the higher payoff varies across comparisons.  Eckel and Grossman 
(2002) constructed a similar method but hold the probabilities fixed and vary the payoffs.   A 
troubling result from the experimental literature is that the degree of risk aversion of an 
individual varies across elicitation techniques over similar sized stakes.  Isaac and James (2000) 
find that risk attitudes differ between first price auctions and the BDM procedure (see also Berg, 
Dickhaut, McCabe 2005 and Schoemaker, 1990).  Dave, Eckel, Johnson, and Rojas (2007) report 
that the Eckel and Grossman mechanism and the Holt and Laury mechanism give significantly 
different estimates of risk aversion. It is not simply the case that a particular mechanism makes 
everyone look more risk averse.  Rather, as stated by Isaac and James (2000) there is a 
“significant reordering of individuals in terms of the ranking of implied risk parameters” 
(p.187).4 
An alternative approach to measuring risk has evolved in the psychology literature.  
Psychologists have attempted to identify individual differences in personality and attitudes that 
                                                            
4 Interestingly, Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström (2005) find that the implied risk attitudes of the Holt and 
Laury procedure are stable over time as shown by retesting subjects after a period of several months.   
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account for variance in performance on decision-making tasks that involve risk.  For example, 
researchers have shown that broad personality traits, such as those included in Costa and 
McRae’s (1992) Five-Factor Model of personality (neuroticism, extraversion, openness to 
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness), predict risk taking propensity across a variety 
of situations and tasks (see Gullone and Moore, 2000; Markey, Markey, Ericksen, and Tinsley, 
2006).  In addition, researchers have demonstrated that self-reported measures of risk attitudes, 
such as Weber, Blais, and Betz’s (2002) domain-specific Risk-Attitude Scale predict risky 
decision-making behavior across different domains (see Horvath and Zuckerman, 1993; Sitkin 
and Weingart, 1995). Thus, there is evidence that a dispositional approach may be useful to 
understanding risk propensity and psychological measures that capture risk may be useful for the 
a priori prediction of risk propensity. Consequently, individual differences may help explain the 
apparent within-subject inconsistency between different behavioral measures of risks, consistent 
with the argument put forward by Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel (2008). To 
explore this hypothesis, a series of laboratory experiments were conducted to measure risk under 
three elicitation methods (a modified Holt and Laury procedure with real stakes, a variation of 
the game show Deal or No Deal with real stakes, and a hypothetical questionnaire) and measure 
the subject’s personality traits using the Five Factor Model and the Risk-Attitude Scale.   
As a prelude to the results, the familiar result that subjects are not consistent across the 
elicitation techniques is observed.  However, certain personality characteristics are found to 
significantly impact observed risk behavior in some elicitation techniques and not in others.  For 
example, a subject’s risk attitude towards investment decisions as measured by Weber et al. 
(2002) influences behavior in the Holt and Laury task but not in Deal or No Deal.  In contrast, 
attitudes towards gambling impact behavior in Deal or No Deal, but not the Holt and Laury task.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the experimental 
design including the elicitation techniques and the survey instruments.  The results are presented 
and discussed in a separate section and the final section contains concluding comments.          
 
2. Experimental Design 
 The experiments consisted of three computerized parts; the Holt and Laury task, the Deal 
or No Deal task, and a survey.  Subjects were paid their earnings for both the Holt and Laury and 
Deal or No Deal tasks at the end of the experiment.  Each subject was assigned to one of 6 
treatments, which differed in the order that the parts were presented to the subjects. This design 
controls for sequencing effects, and creates the possibility of wealth effects as some subjects will 
have earned different amounts of money prior to completing one of the paid tasks.  This design is 
intentional as one can directly measure wealth effects ex post.          
 A total of 75 subjects participated in the experiment.  The subjects were drawn from the 
undergraduate student, graduate student, faculty, and staff population of the business school at a 
state university and thus represented a wide variety of ages, incomes, and education levels.  Each 
participant was paid $2.50 plus earnings for participating in the approximately 30 minute 
experiment.5 The average salient payment was $14.45.  Given the individual nature of these 
experiments, subjects were allowed to begin the experiment at any point during a block of time 
lasting several hours.  Thus, most but not all observations were concurrent with observations in 
other treatments.  When a subject arrived at the lab she would draw a slip of paper containing a 
subject number from a bag.  This subject number determined the treatment (ordering).  As 
                                                            
5 Subjects were told that the experiment could last up to 45 minutes, but was expected to last about 30 minutes. 
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subjects used this number instead of their names, their response to the sometimes sensitive 
survey items could not be connected to the individual.      
2.1 Holt and Laury task 
 Holt and Laury developed the task shown in Table 1.  A respondent is shown 10 binary 
comparisons, the rows of Table 1, and selects either Option A or Option B for each one.  The 
payoffs for Option A are fixed at $2.00 and $1.60 while the payoffs for Option B are fixed at 
$3.85 and $0.10.  In each successive row, the likelihood of receiving the larger payoff increases.  
In the final row there is no uncertainty and monotonicity alone is sufficient to lead a person to 
select Option B.  In the other comparisons, the choice is dependent on the level of risk aversion.  
The original Holt and Laury design did not involve a comparison with 0 likelihood of receiving 
the larger payoff so that monotonicity would be sufficient to lead a person to select Option A.  
The main difference between the current study and that of Holt and Laury is the inclusion of a 
choice where there is no likelihood of receiving the maximum payoff, thus providing an 
additional check on comprehension assuming subjects prefer more money to less. Figure 1 shows 
the screen for the modified Holt and Laury task (H&L).  
To identify a respondent’s level of risk aversion one need only determine the point at 
which subjects switch from preferring option A to preferring Option B going down the table.  
The last column of Table 1 provides the implied CRRA parameter consistent with someone first 
selecting Option B on that decision.  For example, a risk neutral person would select Option A in 
the first four rows of Table 1 (five rows including the 0 likelihood of the larger payoff in Figure 
1) and Option B in the last 6 rows.   
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Table 1.  The Binary Comparions of Holt and Laury (2002) 
Option A Option B Implied Range of 
CRRA Risk 
Parameter   
for Switching from 
A to B
Chance Payoff Chance Payoff Chance Payoff Chance Payoff 
1/10 $2.00 9/10 $1.60 1/10 $3.85 9/10 $0.10  
2/10 $2.00 8/10 $1.60 2/10 $3.85 8/10 $0.10 r < -0.95
3/10 $2.00 7/10 $1.60 3/10 $3.85 7/10 $0.10 -0.95 < r < -0.49
4/10 $2.00 6/10 $1.60 4/10 $3.85 6/10 $0.10 -0.49 < r < -0.15
5/10 $2.00 5/10 $1.60 5/10 $3.85 5/10 $0.10 -0.15 < r < 0.15
6/10 $2.00 4/10 $1.60 6/10 $3.85 4/10 $0.10 0.15 < r < 0.41
7/10 $2.00 3/10 $1.60 7/10 $3.85 3/10 $0.10 0.41 < r < 0.68
8/10 $2.00 2/10 $1.60 8/10 $3.85 2/10 $0.10 0.68 < r < 0.97
9/10 $2.00 1/10 $1.60 9/10 $3.85 1/10 $0.10 0.97 < r < 1.37
10/10 $2.00 0/10 $1.60 10/10 $3.85 0/10 $0.10 1.37 < r 
 
 
Figure 1.  Screen Image of Implemented Holt and Laury Task 
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In the current study as well as the original study by Holt and Laury, subjects were 
informed in advance that only one choice would be randomly selected to determine the payoff 
after they had made their selection for each comparison.  In the current study, the random 
selection was determined by the roll of a die.6 Once a comparison was selected subjects rolled a 
ten sided die to determine their actual payoff based upon they option that had been selected.  The 
information presented to subjects during the experiment indicated what payoff would result from 
each possible roll of the die.  For example, if there was a 4/10 chance of receiving the larger 
payoff the numbers {1,2,3,4} were displayed beside this payoff and the numbers {5,6,7,8,9,10} 
were displayed by the smaller payoff.  This was explained to subjects in the directions, which 
were visible throughout the experiment (see Figure 1). Subjects went through a practice trial, 
complete with dice rolls, after making their initial choices for each of the comparisons. After the 
practice trial, subjects could adjust their responses prior to the determination of their payoff.        
2.2 Deal or No Deal task 
This task is modeled on the popular game show Deal or No Deal.7  While shown in many 
countries with varying rules, the basic format is similar.   Once a contestant is selected a number 
of briefcases holding various amounts of money are displayed.  The distribution of amounts is 
known, but the contestant does not know the content of any briefcase.  At the first stage the 
contestant selects a single brief case which is set aside. This is the only briefcase from which the 
contestant can collect the amount of money inside. The game then proceeds to a series of rounds 
in which the contestant opens other briefcases revealing the amounts of money inside.  At the 
end of each round, an offer is made that the contestant can accept in exchange for the set aside 
                                                            
6 The comparisons were numbered one through eleven.  A 12-sided die was rolled to determine which comparison 
was used.  Subjects were informed that if they rolled a 12, they would simply reroll the die.  Thus each of the 11 
comparisons was equally likely to be selected.   
7 See Deck et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion of the game show. 
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briefcase (Deal) or can reject and thus move on to the next round (No Deal).  The game ends 
when either the contestant takes the deal or has opened all of the remaining briefcases and is paid 
the amount in the briefcase that was originally set aside.     
 The laboratory version of Deal or No Deal (DOND) is similar but not identical to the 
game show.   One difference is that subject do not set aside an initial case, but rather receive the 
last remaining briefcase.  A total of 12 cases are presented with cash amounts varying from $0.01 
to $100.00.  The number of cases and the dollar amounts are smaller than in the game show 
where there are twenty something cases and prizes upwards of $1,000,000 depending on the 
version of the show.   
Figure 2.  Screen Image of Implemented Deal or No Deal Task 
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 Figure 2 presents a sample image of the subject’s screen.  The amounts of money are 
shown on the top right, with amounts in red having been eliminated in earlier rounds.  The gray 
boxes on the right represent the cases; each randomly assigned to contain one of the specified 
amounts.  Before any cases have been opened the offer is $2.99.  In subsequent rounds the offer 
is a predetermined percentage of the expected value of the remaining cases.  Table 2 gives the 
percentage, which were available to the subjects on the “Offer Percentages” tab (see Figure 2).  
In the game show contestants do not know how the offer is determined and it is not a simple 
percentage of expected value.  The ability to use a deterministic offer function is an advantage of 
the laboratory as researches cannot know how respondents imagine offers to be generated when 
the process is unknown.  Another difference between the laboratory version and the game show 
is that game show contestants open multiple briefcases prior to being made an offer in early 
rounds whereas laboratory subjects were given an offer after each round.  As shown in Figure 2, 
the directions are displayed on the left hand side of the screen throughout the experiment.  After 
pressing “Begin” subject go through an unpaid practice game before going through the paid task.        
Following Deck et al. (2008), one can estimate a measure of risk aversion by observing 
what offers a person accepts and rejects.  Consider a person with only two reaming briefcases i 
and j containing the amounts Bi and Bj and an offer Oij.  The person should accept the offer if the 
utility of the offer, u(Oij), exceeds the expected utility of rejecting it, u(Bi)/2+u(Bj)/2.  With three 
remaining briefcases i, j and k and an offer Oijk acceptance implies that  
]
2
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3
1]
2
)(
2
)(),(max[
3
1)( kjjkkiik
ji
ijijk
BuBuOuBuBuOu
BuBuOuOu +++++>  . 
This formulation assumes that the person will make the optimal decision in the final round. And 
its extension to earlier rounds is intuitive. The decision to continue provides some lower bound 
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on the degree of risk aversion while the decision to accept an offer provides an upper bound. 
Given the offer percentages provided in Table 2, a risk neutral person would reject offers when 
more than two cases remain and would accept the offer when exactly two briefcases remain.  A 
person who is risk loving would never accept an offer and a person who is risk averse would 
accept prior to reaching the round with two briefcases remaining.8 Unlike the Holt and Laury 
procedure where the degree of risk aversion can be determined by the switching point, in this 
procedure the stopping point can imply a different levels of risk aversion depending on the dollar 
amounts in the unopened briefcases.  The estimation technique follows that of Deck et al. (2008); 
a series of possible risk parameters are considered and a subject is found to be consistent with a 
given risk parameter if that parameter value would lead to the same choices as those observed for 
the subject.                
Table 2.  Offer Percentages by Round 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Offer as 
Percentage of 
Expected 
Value 
19% 65% 74% 80% 84% 88% 91% 94% 97% 99% 101% _ 
 
2.3 Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument collected three types of information from each subject.9  First it 
collected demographic information such as age, gender, ethnicity, and parent’s education.  The 
second portion of the survey instrument collected measures of individual characteristics as 
developed in the psychology literature including the Five Factor Model of Personality (Costa and 
                                                            
8 Given that this method provides bounds on risk attitudes, a person could be barely risk seeking and still stop with 
two cases remaining just as someone who is barely risk averse might continue until two cases remain.  This is true of 
the Holt and Laury procedure as well.     
9 The survey is available from the researchers upon request.   
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McRae, 1992) and the Risk Attitudes Scale of Weber et al. (2002).10  The final portion of the 
survey provided additional measures of risk aversion that have been used in previous economic 
analysis.    
The Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality specifies that five traits (i.e., extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness) are fundamental and universal. In 
particular, there is evidence that the FFM subsumes competing trait models of personality (see 
Costa and McCrae, 1992; Gill and Hodgkinson, 2007). As such, the FFM is one of the most 
commonly used personality taxonomies in the management and psychology literatures. Research 
has consistently shown that the “Big 5” traits (i.e., the traits included in the FFM) are stable 
across adulthood (McCrae and Costa, 1990) and predict a variety of work- (e.g., task 
performance, citizenship behaviors, job satisfaction, and training proficiency) and non-work- 
(e.g., creativity, life satisfaction, smoking, personality disorders, decision-making) related 
attitudes, behaviors, and phenomena (Malouff,  Thorsteinsson,  and Schutte, 2006; Saulsman and 
Page, 2004; Barrick and Mount, 1991). Furthermore, research has shown that the Big 5 traits are 
related to judgment and decision-making across a variety of contexts, including jury decisions 
(Clark, Boccaccini, Caillouet, and Chaplin, 2007), entrepreneurial business ventures (Wooten, 
Timmerman, and Folger, 1998), and decisions to engage in risky health-related behaviors 
(Trobst, Wiggins, Costa, Herbst, McCrae, and Masters, 2000).  The Big 5 are purported to affect 
decision making by influencing confidence/overconfidence in decisions, sensitivity to 
information from the environment (McElroy and Down, 2007), and heuristic biases (Trobst et 
al., 2000). In other words, there is evidence that personality, as operationalized by the FFM, can 
be used to explain why different people approach certain tasks and situations in different ways.   
                                                            
10 For a general discussion of the need to incorporate psychological measures into economics see Borghans, 
Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel (2008).  
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Consistent with previous research, personality trait markers for the FFM are measured via 
the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999).  This measure assesses each of the Big 
5 traits with ten statements to which the respondents can strongly disagree, disagree, be neutral, 
agree, or strongly agree using a five point Likert scale.  For example, statements regarding 
neuroticism include “I get stressed out easily” and “I seldom feel blue”; agreeableness 
statements include “I insult people” and “I feel little concern for others”; extraversion statements 
include “I am the life of the party” and “I start conversations”; conscientiousness statements 
include “I am always prepared” and “I shirk at my duties”; and openness statements include: “I 
spend time reflecting on things” and “I am quick at understanding things”.  
Scholars have suggested that it is appropriate to consider risk attitudes as a personality 
trait (Weber, 1998). Personality researchers have also noted that, while traits typically shape 
patterns of behavior across situations, there is also a need to recognize aspects of the situation 
that may elicit certain trait-influenced responses (Mischel and Shoda, 1995). With this in mind, 
Weber and colleagues developed the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale.  
DOSPERT assesses willingness to engage in risky decision-making across a variety of domains 
(e.g., social, recreational, health, safety, gambling, ethical, and investments). Supporting the use 
of a domain specific measure of risk, research has demonstrated that risk-taking is highly domain 
specific (Weber et al., 2002; Hanoch, Johnson, and Wilke, 2006). For example, a study by Weber 
et al. (2002) demonstrated that people are not consistently risk averse or risk seeking across the 
six content domains assessed by the scale. In addition, research has provided evidence for the 
validity of this measure by demonstrating that it is related to sensation seeking, dispositional risk 
taking, intolerance for ambiguity, social desirability, performance on gambling tasks, and risky 
health decisions (see Blaise and Weber, 2006; Weber et al., 2002). As such, DOSPERT has been 
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described as one of the most useful measures of risk propensity across a number of everyday 
situations (Harrison, Young, Butow, Salkeld, and Solomon, 1995). 
Consistent with previous research, Weber et al.’s (2002) risk attitudes scale is used to 
assess risk across different situations (i.e., Social, Health and Safety, Ethical, Investment, 
Recreational, and Gambling).  Similar to the measure of the FFM, DOSPERT measures each 
dimension using a series of statements.  The likelihood of engaging in various activities is 
measured with a 5 point Likert scale with responses ranging from Highly Unlikely to Highly 
Likely.  Statements for the social domain include “Approaching your boss to ask for a raise” and 
“Admitting your tastes differ from those of your friends”; statements for the health and safety 
domain include “Engaging in unprotected sex” and “Not wearing a seatbelt while in the front 
seat”; statements for the ethical domain include “Illegally copying a piece of software” and 
“Forging someone’s signature”; statements for the investment domain include “Investing ten 
percent of your annual income in a modest growth mutual fund” and “Investing ten percent of 
your income in government bonds”; statements for the recreational domain include “Trying 
bungee jumping at least once”  and “Vacationing in a third world country without reservations”; 
and statements for the gambling domain include “Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a 
sporting event” and “Gambling a week’s income at a casino.”  
A priori, there is no specific reason to suggest which and how the different risk attitudes 
will relate to the behavior of individuals performing the tasks of DOND and H&L. Based on the 
literature, there is no specific guide for predicting if the tasks will be perceived as gambling or 
investing, for example. Therefore this paper takes an agnostic approach and performs the 
analyses with no priors regarding the relationship between the different risk attitudes scales and 
the degree of risk aversion under the different elicitation methods. There are specific features of 
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each elicitation method that could cause subjects to perceive the tasks differently, thus changing 
the relative importance of different personality characteristics. For example, DOND is a dynamic 
game while H&L is static. This change may systematically alter behavior but the maintained 
assumption here is that this behavioral response is due to a change in the personality domain that 
is driving behavior (i.e., perhaps dynamic games are more likely to be perceived as gambling). 
 Following Nicholson et al. (2005), the FFM is estimated while incorporating the 
DOSPERT attitudes. While Nicholson et al. (2005) utilize Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
regression, the current analysis uses the Partial Least Squares (PLS) method because of the 
relatively small sample size and strong correlation among survey items for each domain.11  In the 
model, the Big Five Factors of Personality are specified as unobserved characteristics (i.e., latent 
variables) that determine the domain-specific risk attitudes which are also specified as latent 
variables. Each unobserved characteristic reveals itself to researchers through a series of survey 
items, which serve as indicators of the latent construct (see Bollen & Lennox, 1991). For 
example, the extent to which someone agrees with the statement “I get irritated easily” reflects 
that person’s neuroticism. These observable items are termed manifest variables. 
Formally, let LVij denote a latent variable for individual i and characteristic j and let MVijk 
denote its manifest variables.  Each of the K manifest variables are measured by a 5-point Likert 
scale. Every manifest variable reflects the latent variable in the sense that 
jkijjkjkijk uLVMV ++= 10 ππ , which looks like a classical linear model except that it cannot be 
estimated because the latent variable is not observed. Latent variables are estimated as weighted 
                                                            
11 For methodological details, refer to Wold (1985), Fornell and Brookstein (1982), Chin (1995), and Tenenhaus et 
al. (2005). The method is well known in fields outside economics such as psychology, marketing, and chemistry. It 
is useful particularly when researchers wish to minimize measurement error when assessing unobservable or 
theoretical constructs, such as personality traits, work attitudes, and perceptions of different social contexts.  
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means of corresponding manifest variables by some procedure of iteration and convergence 
criteria.12  
The structural or path model specifies relationships among latent variables. For simplicity, 
suppose that there are two latent variables, LV1 (e.g. neuroticism) and LV2 (e.g. ethical risk 
attitude). A causal relationship or path should be built based on some theoretical background: 
iii vLVLV ++= 1102 αα . Once the latent variables are replaced with the estimates, the above 
linear equation is estimated by OLS. 
The estimation results are generally consistent with those of Nicholson et al. (2005); 
when the estimates are significant, Extraversion and Openness motivate risk taking while 
Neuroticism, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness depress risk taking. There is only one 
exception; Neuroticism motivates risk taking in the social domain.13 Table 3 provides the Partial 
Least Squares results. 
Table 4 shows how DOSPERT attitudes, elicited by the PLS method from the survey 
items, are related to demographic characteristics. The six DOSPERT measures are jointly 
estimated as dependent variables by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression method. The results are 
consistent with results previously reported in the literature (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). Results 
indicate that men are more prone to take risk in the context of recreation, health/safety, and 
gambling.  The willingness to take risk seems to be decreasing with age across all the domains,  
                                                            
12  An alternative estimate of the latent variable is the arithmetic mean of its manifest variables. That is, 
∑ === Kk ijkijij MVKMVLV 11 . 
13 One may be concerned here since the estimates, although they are overall consistent with expectation, are not 
significant. This is in part due to our small sample size; Nicholson et al. use 1,699 individuals. We can avoid the 
problem of small sample by using simply the arithmetic means of manifest variables instead of the estimated latent 
measures from the PLS method; they are strongly correlated. The results below change little if the means of manifest 
variables are used for the analysis.   
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Table 3. Partial Least Squares Estimation of Big Five Factor Model of Risk Attitudes   
 Social Recreation Health & 
Safety 
Gambling Ethical Investment 
Agreeableness -0.0466 0.0422 -0.0744 -0.2093 -0.2367 0.0153 
 (0.4662) (0.4276) (0.6508) (1.5222) (2.1372) (0.0974) 
Conscientiousness -0.1817 -0.0354 -0.0878 0.0363 -0.2268 0.1694 
 (1.9689) (0.2622) (0.8604) (0.3134) (1.6756) (1.5925) 
Extraversion 0.3812 0.1917 0.3282 0.1176 0.1932 0.1495 
 (3.9602) (1.7053) (3.3164) (0.9814) (1.3381) (1.2724) 
Neuroticism 0.2916 0.1209 0.2169 -0.0839 0.1599 -0.0710 
 (2.7632) (0.7290) (1.1689) (0.6436) (0.8111) (0.5939) 
Openness 0.1307 0.2876 0.2358 0.2534 -0.0076 0.1363 
 (1.2575) (2.1857) (1.9351) (2.3384) (0.0452) (1.1334) 
* The number of observations is 75 survey respondents. The t statistic, computed by bootstrapping, is present in 
parentheses. The model is estimated by SmartPLS®, which is available at http://www.smartpls.de/.  
  
Table 4. Estimated DOSPERT Measures and Demographic Characteristics:  
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results 
 
 
Social Recreation Health & 
Safety 
Gambling Ethical Investment 
Male -0.143    0.474***   0.350**    0.703*** -0.040 0.268 
 (0.260) (0.161) (0.166) (0.242) (0.235) (0.164) 
White -0.571 0.348  -0.595** 0.217 -0.094   0.616** 
 (0.470) (0.291) (0.301) (0.438) (0.424) (0.297) 
Asian -1.083* 0.359   -1.309*** 0.557 -0.293    1.246*** 
 (0.587) (0.364) (0.376) (0.548) (0.531) (0.371) 
Age -0.025 -0.026** -0.020* -0.021 -0.030 -0.0001 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) 
Mom - HS Graduate -0.301 0.017 -0.518 -0.180 -0.575 -0.142 
 (0.674) (0.418) (0.431) (0.629) (0.609) (0.426) 
Mom - Some College -0.421 -0.092 -0.425 -0.163 -0.753 -0.063 
 (0.635) (0.394) (0.407) (0.593) (0.574) (0.401) 
Constant     4.198***    2.680***    3.596***   1.942**    3.668*** 2.938 
 (0.915) (0.567) (0.586) (0.853) (0.826) (0.578) 
R squared 0.065 0.206 0.260 0.151 0.072 0.174 
 
although the effects are only significant in recreation and health/safety. Interestingly, race plays 
different roles across different domains. Caucasians are more willing to take risk in investments 
while they are more risk averse in the health/safety domains. Asians in this sample have similar 
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traits as Caucasians. It seems that mother’s education decreases the willingness to take risk 
across all the domains, although not statistically significant.  
The survey instrument also measured the degree of risk aversion directly albeit based 
upon hypothetical responses.  Following (Dohmen et al., 2005), subjects were asked how much 
of $100,000 in lottery winnings they would invest in an asset that would either double or halve in 
value over the next two years. Each subject selects a response from a list of options; therefore an 
interior choice identifies an upper and lower bound for the CRRA parameter.14 Additionally, 
respondents completed questions regarding a hypothetical scenario in which they could accept a 
new job that would either double their income or cut it in by some fraction with equal 
probability.15 These questions are presented as part of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) (see Spivey, 2007) and the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) (see Barsky et al., 
1997). 
 
3.  Results 
 The results are presented in three stages.  First, the individual risk measures are presented 
separately and compared with previously reported measures of risk preferences.  The general 
result is that there is considerable heterogeneity across subjects. Next, responses are compared 
within subject across elicitation methods.  As before, these is considerable variation across 
elicitation methods for the same subject’s implied risk parameter. Finally, the personality 
characteristics are utilized to explain within subject variation.     
                                                            
14 Assuming the CRRA function, the response bounds the participant’s risk aversion parameter. There were five 
possible responses leading to six risk intervals with the five cutoff values of r = 0.558, 0.72, 1, 1.636, and 4.91. 
15 Again assuming the CRRA function, the possible responses lead to four intervals with three cutoffs of r =1, 2, and 
3.76.  
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3.1 Individual Risk Attitudes by Elicitation Method.   
Table 5 compares the results of the current study with those of Holt and Laury.  As 
evidenced by the table, subjects in the current study were similar to those studied by Holt and 
Laury (the null hypotheses of no difference cannot be rejected at any standard level of 
significance based upon two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).16            
Table 5.  Comparison of Risk Attitudes in Holt and Laury Task. 
Number of 
“Safe Choices” 0-1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-10 
Holt and Laury 
(2002) 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.13 0.03 0.01 
Current Study 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.28 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.01 
The number of safe choices corresponds to the design of Holt and Laury (2002).  The current study included an 
additional comparison with no chance of receiving the larger payoff and thus the number of “safe choices” in the 
current study is actually one greater than what is reported in this table. That is the label 0-1 includes 0-2 safe choices 
in the current study.  Therefore, this table directly compares risk attitudes between the studies.    
 
 Figure 3 compares the risk attitudes of the subjects in the Deal or No Deal task with those 
of contestants on the actual game show as reported in Deck et al. (2008).17  The general result is 
that the subjects tended to be far more risk loving than the game show contestants.18  There are at 
least three potential explanations for this result.  One is the size of the stakes which are 
                                                            
16 In both studies some subjects were not consistent with a single switching point from Option A to Option B.  
Individual responses were examined in such cases. Holt and Laury (2002) add the number of safe to determine the 
“switching” point. In the current study, this is addressed in two ways. First, if a subject were to select Option A five 
times and then Option B once followed by Option A once and then Option B for the remainder of the choices was 
treated as if she had selected Option A six times and then switched to Option B, consistent with Holt and Laury. 
Second, if a subject made a single choice inconsistent with a unique switching rule and not covered by the first rule 
above, that single choice was considered to be an error. For example, if a subject chose Option A, then Option B, 
then Option A four times before switching to Option B for the remainder, this subject was classified as having 
chosen Option A for six times. There were 11 subjects that made inconsistent decisions. Eight of them were 
reclassified as described and three were too erratic to be classified and therefore are omitted from subsequent 
analyses. 
17 For five subjects bounds for DOND could not be computed. For three of these subjects behavior was inconsistent 
between rounds and two of the subjects accidentally stopped immediately. 
18 This is consistent with the finding of Baltussen, Post, Thaler, and van den Assem (2008). 
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considerable larger on the game show.  Holt and Laury (2002) among others found that a 
dramatic increase in the stakes lead to more risk averse behavior.   
Figure 3.  Deal or No Deal Risk Attitude Bounds in the Lab (Left) and on Television (Right) 
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Another difference between the formats is the presence of an audience; one might have 
greater concern for looking foolish and earning a low pay off on television than in the laboratory. 
A third difference is that subjects knew how offers would be generated.  Knowing that the offer 
as a percentage of expected value would increase in subsequent rounds or simply knowing that 
one was being offered a substantial amount less than the expected value in most rounds may 
have induced people to continue further than they would have without that information.   
Table 6 compares the implied risk attitude of subjects based upon the survey responses 
with what has been reported previously. The general result is that the respondents tend to be less 
risk averse than what has been previously reported.  Possible explanations for the differences are 
the demographic composition of the samples to the degree that such traits impact risk attitudes 
and the comparison respondents draw between these questions and other questions in either 
survey which might impact responses.     
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Table 6.  Comparison of Survey Responses of Economic Risk. 
Lottery Investment Question   
Investment Amount 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Dohmen et al. (2005)    ≈60% ≈18% ≈13% ≈6% ≈2% ≈1% 
Current Study 9.3% 16.0% 33.3% 22.7% 10.7% 8.0% 
 
Accepting Risky Job Questions 
Risk Type Very Strongly 
Risk Averse 
Strongly 
Risk Averse 
Moderately  
Risk Averse 
Weakly  
Risk Averse 
HRS - Barsky et al. (1997)  64.6% 11.6% 10.9% 12.8% 
NLSY - Spivey (2007)   46% 12% 17% 25% 
Current Study 20.8% 36.1% 25% 18.1% 
 
 
3.2 Comparison of Risk Attitudes by Elicitation Method within Subjects.   
As with previous research, the results of the different elicitation techniques are 
troublesome.  Not only do the same subjects differ with regard to their estimated level of risk 
aversion; attitudes are only weakly correlated between elicitation techniques.19   
Figure 4 provides a scatter plot of the midpoint for the risk attitude of each subject under 
the Holt and Laury task and the Deal or No Deal task.20  If the risk parameter were the same 
under both elicitation methods, the observations would lay on (or near) the 45 degree line.  They 
do not.  Subjects in the top left and bottom right of this plot actually switch from being risk 
loving to being risk averse or vice versa.  The correlation between the two tasks is 0.008 (p-value 
                                                            
19 One potential difference in the two paid tasks is the relative size of the stakes.  The average payment in the Deal 
or No Deal task was approximately six times that of the average payment in the Holt and Laury task.  However, 
evidence suggests that this is not problematic.  While the current data does not address this concern, the original 
study by Holt and Laury (2002) compared behavior within subjects at different wealth levels.  93 subjects in that 
study made decisions with the stakes used in the current study, then decisions with stakes 20 times greater, and then 
decisions with the low stakes again.  There is substantial correlation between the implied risk attitudes at the two 
stake levels (correlation = 0.64 between average low stakes response and the 20 times stakes response) suggesting 
the change in rankings of risk attitudes is not merely the result of changing stakes. Further, the typical finding is that 
increases in stakes lead to more risk aversion, the opposite pattern to what is observed here. Thus, the behavioral 
shift attributed to changing the task is understated. 
20 A lower bound of -5 is used for subjects who went all of the way in Deal or No Deal.  For two subjects, one bound 
is missing for the Holt and Laury task; these bounds were imputed using the average distance of the intervals for the 
properly bounded subjects.  The figure excludes subjects whose behavior could not be characterized. 
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= 0.9494).  The correlation between the job and lottery survey measures of risk is -0.103 (p-value 
= 0.3889).21  The greatest correlation between two of the four measures is 0.242 (p-value = 
0.0420) for the Holt and Laury procedure and the job survey.  No other pair of measures is 
significantly correlated even at the 10% level.  
Figure 4.  Plot of CRRA Risk Parameters in Holt and Laury and Deal or No Deal Tasks 
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The analysis of the midpoint is informative but one must be cautious since the actual risk 
parameter could lie anywhere in the interval.  However the data clearly showed that risk aversion 
varies across different elicitation methods within subjects. 22   Fifty percent of the subjects 
definitely were less risk averse or more risk loving in DOND than in H&L because interval of 
consistent risk parameters for DOND was strictly below the interval of consistent risk parameters 
for H&L.  Thirteen percent of subjects definitely were more risk averse in DOND.  For the 
                                                            
21 Correlations for the job and lottery risk surveys are based upon rank.  
22 This is based upon the 67 subjects for whom bounds could be computed for both DOND and H&L. 
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remainder of the subjects, the two intervals from DOND and H&L had some overlap.  
Interestingly, those who were less risk averse in DOND are more likely to be male and younger. 
3.3 Explaining Within Subject Variation with Personality Characteristics.   
To explain the apparent inconsistency between risk measures, the analysis now turns to 
the individual characteristics from the psychology literature.23 The estimation assumes that the 
risk aversion parameter, iγ , is normally distributed and iid across individuals, iii X εβγ +=  and 
),0(~ 2σε Ni . The mean is assumed to depend upon the estimated latent variables for the 
domain-specific risk attitudes as well as demographic characteristics. Initially the specification 
allowed for heterogeneity in σ, but no explanatory variable turns out to be significant in 
determining it except for the intercept.24 The likelihood function is  
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where γU and γL are the upper and lower bounds of the CRRA parameter, respectively. U and L 
are indicator functions for the existence of the upper and lower bounds, respectively. The 
maximum likelihood estimation results are presented in Table 7.25  
 
                                                            
23 Shor (2007) and Schmitt et al. (2005) examine a similar issue in simple allocation games.  Shor (2007) examines 
how attitudes towards distributive and procedural justice impact behavior in the ultimatum and dictator game.  
Schmitt et al. (2005) consider Briggs-Myers personality types impact behavior in the ultimatum game with pre-
commitment.     
24 In order to control for a possible wealth effect, the amount of prize money that the subject had earned during 
participation in any previous portion of the experiment was included, but the variable turned out to be insignificant. 
An indicator variable of whether the subject had played DOND prior to H&L was included to see if there is any 
effect of learning or experience. The variable was also insignificant and it is dropped from the final specification.   
25 The results are based upon 65 usable observations. Two observations are lost because of missing demographic 
information and bounds for DOND and H&L could not be computed for eight subjects. 
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 Table 7. Impact of Personal Characteristics on Risk Attitudes Across Elicitation Methods 
 DOND H&L 
Lottery 
Survey 
Job  
Survey 
Social 0.043 -0.114  -0.256++ -0.096 
 (0.083) (0.110) (0.155) (0.198) 
Recreation -0.194 -0.009    -0.830+++ -0.566+ 
 (0.152) (0.209) (0.287) (0.356) 
Health and Safety 0.172 0.274 -0.065 0.453 
 (0.156) (0.221) (0.299) (0.381) 
Gambling   -0.161++ -0.062 -0.039 -0.181 
 (0.090) (0.126) (0.169) (0.221) 
Ethical 0.055  -0.259++ 0.045 0.149 
 (0.093) (0.131) (0.180) (0.231) 
Investment -0.005   -0.495+++ -0.310 -0.211 
 (0.124) (0.177) (0.252) (0.313) 
Male -0.0002   0.534**   0.824**    1.071** 
 (0.183) (0.268) (0.366) (0.482) 
White -0.169   -1.621*** -1.020 -0.615 
 (0.321) (0.471) (0.662) (0.869) 
Asian -0.041 -0.701 -0.889 0.526 
 (0.489) (0.679) (0.941) (1.214) 
Age  0.023* -0.003 -0.007 0.048 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.023) (0.030) 
Mom - HS Graduate -1.031* -0.424 0.311 0.122 
 (0.561) (0.647) (0.827) (1.064) 
Mom - Some College -0.927* -0.280 0.207 0.437 
 (0.537) (0.611) (0.776) (1.001) 
Constant  0.662   4.148***   6.040*** 2.201 
 (0.867) (1.190) (1.651) (2.011) 
Standard Deviation (σ)    0.557***    0.875***   1.195***   1.476*** 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.120) (0.181) 
Number of Observations 68 70 73 71 
Log Likelihood -123.9 -172.8 -147.7 -90.23 
McFadden’s pseudo R 
squared 
0.087 0.110 0.093 0.076 
 
Note: The one-tailed test of H0: β ≥ 0 and H1: β < 0 is done for the DOSPERT scales. +, ++, and +++ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. For the other variables, the two-tailed t test of H0: β = 0 
and H1: β ≠ 0 is done. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Given that there is no reason to believe that higher scores for the social, recreational, 
health and safety, ethical, gamble, and investment domains should increase risk aversion, one-
tailed test for the non-positive impacts of DOSPERT measures on the risk aversion parameter are 
used.  
The results are striking.  Behavior in the Deal or No Deal task correlates with a person’s 
attitude towards gambling, but gambling attitudes do not impact behavior in the Holt and Laury 
task. 26  It appears that subjects view the Deal or No Deal task as gambling, subjects who 
indicated willingness to gamble appear less risk averse in Deal or No Deal.  On the other hand, 
the Holt and Laury procedure correlates with a subject’s attitude towards investments.  The more 
likely a person is willing to invest “income in a very speculative stock” the less risk averse they 
will appear as measured by the Holt and Laury task.  This is not true for Deal or No Deal; 
subjects are not viewing that task as an investment. The Holt and Laury task is also associated 
with ethical attitudes but to a smaller degree and significance than investment attitudes. 
Interestingly, the survey questions about investing lottery winnings are not associated with either 
gambling or investing, but are associated with social and recreation risk attitudes. Responses to 
the job choice survey are not associated with any of the six risk attitude measures. 
Given the results presented in Table 7, an individual’s implied level of risk aversion will 
vary across tasks based upon their personality characteristics. The results show cross-sectional 
relationships between risk aversion and psychological measures. Given that psychological 
measures are significantly different within individuals as well as across individuals, this variation 
                                                            
26 The Holt and Laury procedure is a comparison of two lotteries while Deal or No Deal is a comparison of a fixed 
amount and a lottery.  This distinction may in part explain why people view the tasks differently.  The change in the 
way subjects view the tasks could also be due to the visual presentations, the word choices in the task directions, or 
familiarity with the popular game show.    
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explains how one person could appear more risk averse than someone else in one task and less 
risk averse than that same person in another task.27 
Table 8 shows how risk taking attitudes change across different domains within subjects. 
It is not surprising to find that the attitudes are correlated between different domains since they 
should be fundamentally rooted in risk aversion in general. Indeed, in many cases, the hypothesis 
of independency can be rejected. It is, however, also true that attitudes are not perfectly or 
strongly correlated, consistent with Cohen (1988).  
Table 8. Within-Subject Correlations Between Domain-Specific Risk Taking Attitudes 
 Social Recreation 
Health and 
Safety Gambling Ethical 
Recreation 0.2077     
 (0.0738)     
Health and Safety 0.3525 0.4889    
 (0.0019) (0.0000)    
Gambling 0.1788 0.3066 0.4136   
 (0.1248) (0.0075) (0.0002)   
Ethical 0.2354 0.2353 0.3818 0.2762  
 (0.0420) (0.0421) (0.0001) (0.0164)  
Investment -0.0048 0.2244 0.0797 0.1710 -0.1136 
 (0.9676) (0.0529) (0.4965) (0.1425) (0.3318) 
Note: Spearman correlation test p-values are in parentheses.   
The other demographic information is revealing as well.  Previous studies have tended to 
report that women are more risk averse then men (see Charness and Gneezy, 2007). For example, 
Weber et al. (2002) found that women were more risk averse across all domains except for social 
risk. Weber et al. (2002) suggested that this is because women have different perceptions of the 
                                                            
27 One might explicitly measure the gap between two risk measures, for example, LHi &,γ  from H&L and DONDi,γ  
from DOND. The above MLE method can be used to estimate DONDLH ββ −&  where the upper and lower bounds 
for the dependent variable are LDONDi
U
LHi ,&, γγ −  and UDONDiL LHi ,&, γγ − , respectively. For the current sample the 
results of this estimation are qualitatively in harmony with those in Table 7. 
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activities’ benefits and risks relative to men. In addition, McCrae (2002) reported gender 
differences across more general personality traits (e.g., neuroticism, openness, and 
conscientiousness) associated with the FFM.  In the current research, the results indicate that, 
after controlling for risk attitudes, gender is significant for the Holt and Laury task and the 
hypothetical survey elicitation methods.  However, the data suggest that it is men who are more 
risk averse. Age and mother’s education impact behavior, but only in DOND.  Curiously, 
ethnicity matters but only for the H&L procedure.  Caucasian respondents were more willing to 
take what is perceived as an investment risk.  
4. Conclusions 
 Risk is ubiquitous and as such much attention has been given to trying to measure risk.  
This paper does not attempt to resolve the ongoing debate about how to model risk (CRRA, 
CARA, Prospect Theory, etc.).  Rather this paper asks a more fundamental question; can risk be 
reduced to a problem of payoffs and probabilities?  The results suggest that the general answer is 
no; respondents view different risky situations differently.  Models that examine risk based 
purely on probabilities and outcomes cannot capture the subtlety of the context in which the 
decision is made.  The experimental version of Deal or No Deal as implemented in this study is 
viewed as gambling whereas the Holt and Laury procedure as implemented in this study is 
viewed as a financial decision.  It is well known that bidders act as if they are more risk averse in 
single unit first price sealed bid auctions experiments than in single unit Dutch clock auction 
experiments with independent private values even though those environments are strategically 
equivalent.  Perhaps this can be explained by the way subjects view those tasks.  A reasonable 
hypothesis for further research is that bidding in the Dutch auction, in which the bidder watches 
potential profits grow while risking a payoff of zero, is impacted by a respondent’s attitude 
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towards gambling while bidding in a first price sealed bid auction is not.  As mentioned above, 
Dave, Eckel, Johnson, and Rojas report different results when comparing the Holt and Laury task 
and the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task which fixes probabilities and changes payoffs.  Bruner 
(2007) does something similar but does not find that the elicitation method changes behavior 
substantially.  One difference in the two studies is how the alternative task is presented to the 
respondents.  Bruner (2007) presents the two tasks in table format.  Dave et al. (2007) present the 
task as selecting one lottery from a set of 6 possibilities.  Perhaps this change triggers how the 
respondents view the problem and thus leads different personality traits to become relevant in the 
decision making process.   
More broadly, this paper demonstrates how personality measures can be used to predict 
economic behavior. The use of such measures has received relatively little attention in 
economics as evidenced by the following quote: 
The lack of familiarity of economists with these personality measures is one reason for 
their omission from most economic studies. Another reason is that many economists have 
yet to be convinced of their predictive validity, stability or their causal status, believing 
instead that behavior is entirely situationally determined. …Without evidence that there is 
value in knowing which personality traits are most important in predicting outcomes, 
there is little incentive to include sufficiently broad and nuanced personality measures in 
empirical studies. – Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel (2008, p. 4) 
 
Based upon the current results it is clear that personality impacts risk aversion. However, it 
remains to be determined if these or other personality characteristics have explanatory power for 
other economic behavior. Clearly, more research is warranted in this area.     
 
 
 
 
  29
References 
 
Andersen, Steffen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutström. 2006a. 
“Dynamic Choice Behavior in a Natural Experiment.” Working Paper 06-10, Department of 
Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida. 
 
Andersen, Steffen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutström. 2006b. “Dual 
Criteria Decisions.” Working Paper 06-11, Department of Economics, College of Business 
Administration, University of Central Florida. 
  
Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W., Lau, Morten I., and Rutström, E. Elisabet. 2007. “Risk 
Aversion in Game Shows.”  in J.C. Cox and G.W. Harrison (eds.), Risk Aversion in 
Experiments (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 12, 
forthcoming). 
 
Baltussen, Guido, Post, Thierry, Thaler, Richard H., and Van den Assem, Martijn J. 2008. “Deal 
or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show.” American 
Economic Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, currently available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636508  
 
Barrick, M. R. and Mount, K. 1991. “The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job 
Performance: A Meta-analysis.” Personnel Psychology, 44, 1-26.  
 
Barsky, R., F. Juster, M. Kimball, M. Shapiro.  1997.  “Preference Parameters and Behavioral 
Heterogeneity:  an Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, pp. 537-579.    
 
Becker, Degroot and Marschak. 1963.  “Probabilities of Choices Among Very Similar Objects: 
An Experiment to Decide Between Two Models.” Behavioral Science 8(4), pp. 306-311.  
 
Beetsma, and Schotman. 2001. “Measuring Risk Attitudes in a Natural Experiment: Data from 
the Television Game Show Lingo.” Economic Journal, October, 111,pp.  821-848. 
 
Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. Thaler. 1995. “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium 
Puzzle.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1), February, pp.73-92.  
 
Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe. 2005. “Risk Preference Instability across Institutions: A Dilemma.”  
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (102)11, pp. 4209-4214. 
 
Blais, A-R. and E. U. Weber. 2006. “A Domain-specific Risk-taking (DOSPERT) Scale for 
Adult Populations.” Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 33-47. 
 
Blavatskyy, Pavlo and Ganna Pogrebna. 2006. “Testing the Predictions of Decision Theories in a 
Natural Experiment when Half a Million is at Stake.” Working Paper No. 291, June. 
Institute of Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich. 
 
  30
Bollen, K.A. and R. Lennox. 1991. “Conventional Wisdom on Measurement: A Structural 
Equation Perspective.” Psychological Bulletin, 110:305-14. 
 
Bombardini, Matilde and Francesco Trebbi. 2005. “Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory: 
A Field Experiment with Large and Small Stakes.” Working Paper 05-20, November. 
Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. 
 
Borghans, L., Duckworth, A. L., Heckman, J. J., ter Weel, B. 2008. “The Economics and 
Psychology of Personality Traits” NBER Working Paper, No. 13810. 
 
Botti, Conte, DiCagno, D’Ippoliti.  2007. “Risk Attitudes in Real Decision Problems.”  Working 
Paper, LUISS Guido Carli.   
 
Bruner, D. 2007.  “Changing the Probability versus Changing the Reward:  Evidence from a Risk 
Preference Elicitation Mechanism.” Working Paper, University of Calgary. 
 
Charness, G. and U. Gneezy.  2007.  “Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Investment.”  
Working Paper, University of California at Santa Barbara. 
 
Chin, W. W. 1998. “The Partial Least Squares Approach for Structural Equation Modeling.” In 
G.A. Marcoulides (ed.) Modern Methods for Business Research, Mahwah NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Chin, W. W. 1995. “PLS is to LISREL as Principal Components Analysis is to Common Factor 
Analysis.” Technology Studies, Volume 2, pp. 315-319. 
 
Clark, J., Boccaccini, M. T., Caillouet, B. and W. F. Chaplin, 2007. “Big Five Personality Traits, 
Jury Selection, and Case Outcomes in Real Criminal and Civil Cases.” Criminal Justice and 
Behavior, 34, 641-660.  
 
Cohen, J. 1988. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (2nd edition). Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
 
Costa, P. T.,  and McCrae, R. R. 1992. The NEO PI-R Professional Manual. Odessa, FL: 
Psychological Assessment Resources. 
 
Cox, Smith, and Walker. 1988. “A Test that Discriminates between Two Models of the Dutch-
First Auction Non-Isomorphism.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 4(2-3), 
pp. 205-19. 
 
Cox, J., V. Sadiraj, B. Vogt, and U. Dasgupta. 2007.  “Is There a Plausible Theory for Risky 
Decisions?”  Working Paper, Georgia State University.   
 
Dave, C., C.  Eckel, C. Johnson, and C. Rojas. 2007. “On the Heterogeneity, Stability, and 
Validity of Risk Preference Measures.”  Working Paper, University of Texas at Dallas.    
 
  31
De Roos and  Sarafidis. April 2006. “Decision Making under Risk in Deal or No Deal.” Working 
Paper, School of Economics and Political Science, University of Sidney. 
 
Deck and Farmer 2007 "Bargaining Over an Uncertain Value:  Arbitration Mechanisms 
Compared" Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 23(3), October 2007, pp. 547-
579. 
 
Deck, C., J. Lee, and J. Reyes. 2008. “Risk Attitudes in Large Stake Gambles:  Evidence from a 
Game Show." Applied Economics, 40(1), pp. 41-52 
 
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, U. Sunde, J. Schupp, G. Wagner.  2005.  “Individual Risk 
Attitudes:  New Evidence from a Large, Representative, Experimentally-Validated Survey.” 
IZA Discussion Paper 1730. 
 
Eckel and Grossman. 2002.  “Sex Differences and Statistical Stereotyping in Attitudes toward 
Financial Risk.”  Evolution and Human Behavior 23(4), pp. 281-295. 
 
Farber and Katz. 1979. "Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 33(1), pp. 55-64. 
 
Fornell, Claes and Fred L. Brookstein. 1982. “Two Structural Equation Models: LISREL and 
PLS Applied to Consumer Exit-Voice Theory.” Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 19, 
No. 4, Special Issue on Causal Modeling, pp. 440-452. 
 
Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine. 2006. “A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control.”  American 
Economic Review 96, pp. 1449-1476. 
 
Fullenkamp, Terino and Battalio. 2003. “Assessing Individual Risk Attitudes using Field Data 
from Lottery Games.” Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 85(1), 218-225. 
 
Gertner. 1993. “Game Shows and Economic Behavior: Risk-Taking on Card Sharks.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, May, 507-521. 
 
Gill, C. M., and Hodginskin, G. P. 2007. “Development and Validation of the Five-factor Model 
Questionnaire (FFMQ): An Adjectival-based Personality Inventory for Use in Occupational 
Settings.” Personnel Psychology, 60, 731-766. 
 
Goldberg, L. R. 1999. “A Broad-bandwidth, Public Domain, Personality Inventory Measuring 
the Lower-level Facets of Several Five-factor Models.” In I. Mervielde, I. Deary, F. De 
Fruyt, and F. Ostendorf (Eds.), Personality Psychology in Europe, Vol. 7 (pp. 7-28). 
Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University Press. 
 
Gullone, E., and Moore, S. 2000. “Adolescent Risk-taking and the Five-factor Model of 
Personality.” Journal of Adolescence, 23(4), 393-407. 
Hanoch, Y., Johnson, J.G., and Wilke, A. 2006. “Domain Specificity in Experimental Measures 
and Participant Recruitment.” Psychological Science, 17, 300-304. 
  32
 
Harrison, G. 1990. “Risk Attitudes in First-Price Auction Experiments: A Bayesian Analysis.”  
Review of Economics and Statistics, 72(3), pp. 541-46. 
 
Harrison, G., Johnson, McInnes and Rutström. 2005. "Temporal Stability of Estimates of Risk 
Aversion," Applied Financial Economics Letters, 1(1), pp. 31-35. 
 
Harrison, J. D., Young, J. M., Butow, P., Salkeld, G., and Solomon, M. J. 2005. “Is It Worth the 
Risk? A Systematic Review of Instruments that Measure Risk Propensity for Use in the 
Health Setting.” Social Science and Medicine, 60, 1385-1396.  
 
Hartley, Roger, Gauthier Lanet, and Ian Walker. 2005. “Who Really Wants to Be a Millionaire? 
Estimates of Risk Aversion from Game Show Data.” Working Paper No. 719, Department 
of Economics, University of Warwick. 
 
Hersch, Philip and Gerald S. McDougall. 1997. “Decision Making under Uncertainty when the 
Stakes are High: Evidence from a Lottery Game Show.” Southern Economic Journal, July, 
64(1), 75-84.  
 
Holt, Charles and Susan Laury. 2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” American 
Economic Review, December, 1644 -1655. 
 
Horvath, P., and Zuckerman, M. 1993. “Sensation Seeking, Risk Appraisal, and Risky 
Behavior.” Personality and Individual Differences, 14, 41-52.  
Isaac, R. Mark, and Duncan James. 2000. “Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse.” Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 20(2), 177-87. 
 
Malouff, J. M., Thorsteinsson, E. B., and Schutte, N. S. 2006. “The Five-factor Model of 
Personality and Smoking: A Meta-analysis.” Journal of Drug Education, 36, 47-58.  
 
Markey, C. N., Markey, P. M., Ericksen, A. J., and Tinsely, B. J. 2006. “Children’s Behavioral 
Patterns, the Five-Factor Model of Personality, and Risk Behaviors.” Personality and 
Individual Differences, 41, 1503-1513. 
McCrae, R. R. 2002. “Cross-cultural Research on the Five-factor Model of Personality.” In W. J. 
Lonner, D. L. Dinnel, S. A. Hayes, and D. N. Sattler (Eds.), Online Readings in Psychology 
and Culture (Unit 6, Chapter 1), (http://www.wwu.edu/~culture), Center for Cross-Cultural 
Research, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington USA. 
 
McCrae, R. R. and Costa, P. T. 1990. Personality in Adulthood. New York: The Guildford Press.  
 
McElroy, T. and Dowd, K.  2007. “Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects: How Openness-to-
experience Influences Responses to Anchoring Cues.” Judgment and Decision Making, 2, 
48-53. 
 
  33
Mehra, Rrajnish and Edward C. Prescott. 1985. “The Equity Premium: a Puzzle.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 15: 145-161. 
 
Metrick, Andrew. 1995. “A Natural Experiment in Jeopardy!” American Economic Review, 
March, 85(1), 240-253. 
 
Mischel, W., and Shoda, Y. 1995. “A Cognitive-affective System Theory of Personality: 
Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality 
Structure.” Psychological Review, 102, 246-268. 
 
Mulino, Scheelings, Brooks, and Faff. 2006. “Is a Dollar in the Hand Worth Two in a Lottery? 
Risk Aversion and Prospect Theory in Deal or No Deal.” Working Paper, January. Monash 
University. 
 
Nicholson, N. M. fenton-O’Creevy, E. Soane, and P. Willman.  2005. “Personality and Domain-
Specific Risk Taking.” Journal of Risk Research, March, Vol. 8, No. 2, 157-176.   
 
Rabin, M. 2000.  “Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory:  A Calibration Theorem.”  
Econometrica 68, pp. 1281-1292. 
 
Saha, Atanu. 1993. “Expo-Power Utility: A ‘Flexible’ Form for Absolute and Relative Risk 
Aversion.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 75, No. 4, November, pp. 
905-913. 
 
Saulsman, L. M. and Page, A. C. 2004. “The Five-factor Model and Personality Disorder 
Empirical Literature: A Meta-analytic Review.” Clinical Psychology Review, 23, 1055-
1085. 
 
Schoemaker. 1990.  “Are Risk-Attitudes Related across Domains and Response Modes?” 
Management Science, 36(12), pp. 1451-1463. 
 
Sitkin, S. B., and Weingart, L. R. 1995. “Determinants of Risky Decision-making Behavior: A 
Test of the Mediating Role of Risk Perceptions and Propensity.” Academy of Management 
Journal, 38(6), 1573-1592.  
Spivey, C. 2007.  “Desperation or Desire? The Role of Risk Aversion in Marriage.” Working 
Paper, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.   
 
Tenenhaus, Michel, Vicenzo E. Vinzi, Yves-Marie Chatelin, and Carlo Lauro. 2005. “PLS Path 
Modeling.” Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 48, 159-205. 
 
Tobst, K. K., Wiggins, J. S., Costa, P. T., Herbst, J. H., McCrae, R. R., and Masters, H. L. 2000. 
“Personality Psychology and Problem Behaviors: HIV Risk and the Five-factor Model.” 
Journal of Personality, 68, 1233-1252.  
 
Van Boening, Rassenti, and Smith. 1998. “Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions 
in a First Price Auction with Heterogeneous.” Experimental Economics, 1(2), pp. 147-159. 
  34
 
 
Weber, E. U. 1998. “Who’s Afraid of a Little Risk? New Evidence for General Risk Aversion.” 
In J. Shanteau, B. A. Mellers, and D. Schum (Eds.), Decision Research from Bayesian 
Approaches to Normative Systems: Reflections on the Contributions of Ward Edwards, 43-
64. Norwell, MA: Kluwer.   
 
Weber, E. U., Blais, A., and Betz, N. E. 2002. “A Domain-specific Risk-attitude Scale: 
Measuring Risk Perceptions and Risk Behaviors.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
15, 263-290. 
Wold, Herman. 1985. “Partial Least Squares.” In: Kotz, S., Johnson, N.L. (Eds.), Encyclopedia 
of Statistical Sciences, Vol. 6, Wiley, New York, 581-591. 
Wooten, K. C., Timmerman, T. A., and Folger, R. 1998. “The Use of Personality and the Five-
Factor Model to Predict New Business Ventures: From Outplacement to Start-up.” Journal 
of Vocational Behavior, 54, 82-101.  
